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Abstract: The use of the word ‘empirical’ in the sciences has created an area 
of confusion in which it is taken to mean ‘publicly observable’. Although it is 
understandable, given the success of the sciences, that the use and thought 
behind the word ‘empirical’ should be used in this manner, this mistake runs 
into the risk of overstating the reach of scientific enquiry and of denying per-
sonal experience altogether. By comparing the philosophies of Alex Rosenberg 
and Galen Strawson, it will be argued that private experience is an essential 
component of life that hints at the limitations of public observability. 
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Resumen: El uso de la palabra ‘empírico’ en la ciencia ha creado una cierta con-
fusión, dado que se suele entender como ‘observable públicamente’. Por mucho 
que esta concepción de lo empírico haya sido útil en la ciencia, conlleva el riesgo 
de conferir demasiado poder explicativo a la investigación científica y de incluso 
negar el valor de la experiencia privada. Mediante una comparación entre las 
posiciones filosóficas de Alex Rosenberg y Galen Strawson argumentaremos 
que la experiencia privada constituye un componente esencial de la realidad 
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que pone de relieve las limitaciones de lo públicamente observable
Palabras Claves: Empírico, Experiencial, Rosenberg, Strawson
‘A long tradition of use in which the words ‘empirical’ and ‘publicly observable’ 
have been coextensively applied has led to their confusion.’ – Galen Strawson
Posing the Problem
The word ‘empirical’ is commonly used in the sciences to refer to 
external data, usually within the framework of an explanatory theory. 
Normally, there would be no problem with the use of a specific word in 
the sciences, but in the case of the use of the word ‘empirical’ in relation 
to sentient beings, there is an important distinction which the philoso-
pher Galen Strawson points out. The word ‘empirical’ does not necessitate 
ostention to external things, objects or phenomena. Although it is often 
the case that empirical evidence is accompanied by facts of the world to 
be available for public inspection, the word empirical does not entail or 
necessitate something to be ‘publicly observable’ at all. Furthermore, even 
if something is observable for publication inspection, looking at the exter-
nal factors of sentient creature or phenomena more generally can be very 
misleading, inasmuch a degree as possible, it is best to find out what is 
going on internally in the creature involved, especially if we are talking 
about human beings. So long as the word “empirical’ carries the necessary 
connotation of ‘public observability’, confusion will continue to arise when 
speaking about inner sensations and mental states, and worse still, ta-
king empirical to mean anything which is subject to public inspection can 
drastically distort the scope of science, as is the case with the philosophy 
of Alex Rosenberg.
What then, is the definition of the word ‘empirical’? The Me-
riam-Webster dictionary offers the following definitions: “originating in or 
based on observation or experience <empirical data>”, relying on experience 
or observation alone often without due regard for system and theory <an 
empirical basis for the theory>” and capable of being verified or disproved 
by observation or experiment <empirical laws>”.1 Although this definition 
acknowledges experience as a requisite for empirical research, it is easy to 
overlook what experience entails, which is not limited to external obser-
vation, but to a rich inner mental life. So long as this rich mental life is 
ignored, problems concerning the status of subjective reports and private 
experience will continue to linger, especially in cases of strong sensations 
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such as being in pain, or seeing a loved one, among other types of personal 
experiences.
One is left with then, essentially, that that which is open to obser-
vation, experiment and experience is that which is called ‘empirical’. This, 
initially, would seem to be uncontroversial, for, what else would make sen-
se in trying to construct a reliable and scientific picture of the world? One 
takes what one sees, and within an explanatory framework, one analyzes 
the relevant data and puts forth a hypothesis which will then be either du-
plicated successfully, or not, by other people who go through the same pro-
cess to see if this hypothesis is consistent with observation, and once this is 
done numerous times, in most cases, this data can be called ‘scientific’. In 
the case of the use of the word ‘empirical’, talking about ‘observation’ and, 
to an extent that is less clear, ‘verification’, makes sense.  However, to talk 
about ‘experience’ fitting into that which is called ‘empirical’ (as publicly 
observable) alone is rather obscure and would require some clarification.
It may well be replied that ‘experience’ fitting observation, is nee-
ded, is in fact crucial, to remember previous circumstances which can then 
be used to measure the results of the current experiment. It can also be 
claimed, trivially, that experience is necessary to make sense of certain 
regularities within a given experiment. But the following question arises: 
“how much is one really considering the role of the experiential in our pic-
ture of that which we call ‘empirical’?” It is one thing for a person to look 
through a microscope, or to look at mathematical formulations of such 
and such a theory, after all, it’s open to observation by all, and hence can 
be judged or opined upon by any other normal human being. It’s a whole 
other issue to argue that this is all that experience is or should be when tr-
ying to give a comprehensive account of ‘empirical’ (as publicly observable) 
evidence. In fact, a vast array of human life is forever shut off from public 
observations of this kind. One could even argue that perhaps the most 
important aspects of human life, namely inner mental life and mentality 
is not touched using this criterion. To elucidate this topic further, it will 
be useful to consider what world view arises if one refuses to acknowledge 
the existence of rich inner mental states, which can be called ‘scientism’ 
in Alex Rosenberg’s view and contrast it with a philosophy that acknowle-
dges complex mental life, as is the case with Galen Strawson. After com-
paring both views, one will be forced to conclude that, a rich mental life is 
an essential component of human beings that is not properly grasped by 
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publicly observable methods as they are commonly employed in the hard 
sciences – particularly physics.
Rosenberg’s Observations: Empirical Scienticism
If one assumes that the only valuable evidence one has recourse to 
is found in empirical, publicly observable science - particularly the most 
successful of the sciences, physics - then one would be quite close to Alex 
Rosenberg’s view of what counts as an accurate description of reality, 
which consists of what physics says about it. What makes Rosenberg so 
sure of physics? He begins by stating that “Everything in the universe is 
made up of fermions and bosons. That’s it.” One of the reasons he gives 
for such a statement is that “Because physics predictions are so accurate, 
the methods of physics that produced the description must be equally re-
liable… We have the best of reasons to believe that the methods of physics 
– combining controlled experiments and careful observation with mainly 
mathematical requirements… are the right ones for acquiring all knowle-
dge.” (Rosenberg, 2011: 24) If one begins looking at the world carefully, 
what one finds are trees, and scents and colors and much else of rich phe-
nomenological character, one does not publicly observe atoms in ordinary 
life – although clearly they can be detected by technology and their effects 
can be observed. In any case, it would not be unfair to categorize Rosen-
berg as a type of ‘scientistic materialist’.
One may (and should) concede that physics is the most accurate 
science, but surely things become more obscure if one considers more com-
plex sciences, like biology. While Rosenberg acknowledges that there is 
more complexity in biology, he is rather succinct when he says that “Phy-
sics explains chemistry. And chemistry explains biology. Respiration, re-
production, muscle movement, the nervous system, heredity…all of these 
components of our biology are now well understood as chemical processes, 
and these in turn are explained as physical processes.” While it is true that 
some aspects of biology are available for public observability such as re-
production, respiration and other phenotypical aspects, it does not follow 
that atoms explain the inner workings of these very organisms. However, 
Rosenberg is enthusiastic when he states that “the phenomenal accuracy 
of its [physics] predictions, the unimaginable power of its technological ex-
plications, and the breathtaking extent and detail of its explanations are 
powerful reasons to believe that physics is the whole truth about reality.” 
There is much that falls under the rubric of reality that is not in any ob-
vious and causal manner explained by referencing particles or fields even 
if they were immediately available for public observation. This, however, 
is not convincing for Rosenberg as he continues to state that “As for the 
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rest of reality above the subatomic, all we need to know is what things 
are composed of and how the parts are arranged in order to explain and 
predict their behavior to equal detail and precision. That goes for humans 
too. (Rosenberg, 2011: 25) Notice that what matters for Rosenberg, so far 
as observation goes in relation to physics and reality more broadly cons-
trued is concerned with referencing the (necessarily) publicly observable 
behavior of things -atoms, chemicals, biological creatures – and not the in-
trinsic properties that could be found in these various domains of reality. 
It would be hard to deny the success of physics and it would be futi-
le to even attempt to minimize how much it has progressed in the 20th cen-
tury alone. Yet there seems to be a clear problem in Rosenberg’s account 
of all of reality. If physics so far observed is the most accurate account of 
the nature of total reality, what can be said about the mind? After all, if 
one lacks a mind, it would not be possible to come up with equations that 
could predict the observable behavior of particles. If there is one thing 
that should be even more certain that publicly observable experiments, 
it should be immediate private experience, the qualitative feel of one’s 
own conscious mental state. This much should not be doubted given ele-
mentary experiential facts about lived reality. Rosenberg however, would 
disagree. Rosenberg essentially equates experience, the qualitative feel of 
consciousness as ‘introspection’ and considers it to be illusory and of little 
use in discovering the nature of the reality. In these respects, Rosenberg 
is somewhat cautious when he states that “Of course we think. No one 
denies that. It’s just that thinking is nothing like what conscious intros-
pection tells us it is.” When people have thoughts, about trees or cities, the 
situation should be straightforward, one is thinking about a particular city 
such as Paris. One has Paris in one’s mind and the thought is related, is 
referring to some aspects of the city, this is what empirical experience (as 
opposed to publicly observable experience) feels like. 
The opposite view, a view which denies experiential empiricism 
goes like this: “We believe that Paris is the capital of France. So somewhe-
re in our brain is stored the proposition, the statement, the sentence, idea, 
notion, thought, or whatever, that Paris is the capital of France.” The 
thought of Paris, then is stored in one’s brain and not in one’s mind, but 
it so happens that, according to this view, people’s brains are not thinking 
about Paris at all. After all, the observable evidence is that “…in my brain 
there [are] dozens or hundreds or thousands or millions of neurons wired 
together to store the thought that Paris is the capital of France.” So instead 
of taking thoughts, the most immediate aspect of experience to be about 
things in the world, Rosenberg chooses to focus on the observable neurons 
in one’s brain to talk about a set of neurons trying to refer to things in the 
world. “How can… the Paris neurons in my brain- be about, denote, refer 
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to, name, represent, or otherwise point to… the agglomeration of Paris?... 
How can one clump of stuff anywhere in the universe be about some other 
clump of stuff anywhere else in the universe- right next to it or 100 million 
light years away?” Simply posed, the question asks how can configurations 
of neurons in the brain be about some experiential object in the world? In 
ordinary live, there is no problem thinking about Paris or any other city, 
regardless of where one is in the world. In mental life, all kinds of thoughts 
refer to all kinds of things and people have no trouble talking about the-
se experiential-empirical matters. Things become complicated however, if 
one assumes that thoughts just are neural networks “The Paris neurons 
aren’t about Paris in the same way, for example, that a picture postcard… 
is about Paris. They don’t in any way look like the Arc de Triomphe or the 
Eiffel Tower or the Place de la Concorde.” (Rosenberg, 2011:174-175) This 
much is obvious, though he rhetorically asks “They [neural patterns] don’t 
have to look like Paris to be about Paris. Right?” 
Rosenberg proceeds to argue that it makes no sense for a set of 
neural patterns to be about Paris by claiming that these very Paris neu-
rons refer to another set of neural patterns which “…is both about the Pa-
ris neurons and about Paris.” But this type of argument leads to a regress 
in which neurons about Paris refer to another set of neurons which are 
about the first set of neurons and about Paris, which leads to another set 
of neurons which is about both sets of neurons which are about each other 
and Paris, and so on down an infinite line. The ideal solution, under this 
publicly observable lens would be for “…a clump of matter, in this case the 
Paris neurons, that by the very arrangements of its synapses points at… 
another clump of matter outside the brain.” The problem with this is that 
“…there is no such physical stuff. Physics has ruled out clumps of matter 
of the required sort. There are just fermions and bosons and combinations 
of them.  None of this stuff is just, all by itself, about any other stuff.” 
(Rosenberg, 2011: 179) Besides being confusing and hard to follow, there 
are simply no good reasons to think that the world of experience need be 
constrained by that which is publicly observable. What options are left 
if one is to examine what counts as evidence for anything? One route is 
to claim, alongside Rosenberg, using publicly observable behaviorist lines 
that “…knowing… that Paris is the capital of France is just having a set 
of neurons wired up into an input/output circuit.” (Rosenberg, 2011:185) 
Putting aside the questionable hypothesis that the brain is a computer2, 
2.   Raymond Tallis points out one elementary mistake made by those who think brains 
are a computer is due, in large part to sloppy language and epithet use: “…machines are 
described anthropomorphically and, at the same time, the anthropic terms in which they are 
described undergo a machine-ward shift. These same terms, modified by their life amongst 
the machines, can then be re-applied to minds and the impression is then created that minds 
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which is far from being self-evident, all this talk relating to neurons not 
being about Paris (or anything else) boils down to “[w]hat’s really being 
“learned” is the exquisite coordination of so many packages of neural con-
nections that the behavior it produces looks like it’s the result of thoughts 
being about things in the world. That is especially how it looks like to 
introspection [experience].” (Rosenberg, 2001: 185) In this view, all there 
is, is behavior that looks like aboutness when in reality any aboutness is 
illusion: “…it’s got to be an illusion since nothing physical can be about 
anything. That goes for you conscious thoughts as well.” (Rosenberg, 2011: 
193) Neuroscience has radically advanced in the 20th century3, and much 
about the brain is now known that was previously shrouded in mystery. 
However, it is one thing to claim that neurons in your brain form a neces-
sary part in any experience about anything in the world, to claiming that 
all that happens when one publicly observes anything is simple behavior 
reacting to Paris or dogs or trees. After all, how is it possible to claim any 
scientific discovery whatsoever to be true if the instruments people use to 
arrive at such theories rely on the very experiential aspects of conscious-
ness that are claimed to be illusory? In other words, how is it possible to 
reach reality through illusion? This view is only tenable if one subscri-
bes to the view that the only true and real aspects of the world are those 
which are open to public observation as well as experimental treatment. 
The other option to this publicly observable scientistic view is one which 
takes first person accounts as the most definite certain aspects of existence 
and can be termed ‘experiential empiricism’. It will be explored through 
the philosophy of Galen Strawson and will be contrasted with Rosenberg’s 
claims.
Realistic Reality: Galen Strawson
Contra Rosenberg’s assertion that physics fixes all the facts, and 
is thus the most secure of our knowledge, Galen Strawson states that, in 
the case of ‘experience’ (introspection in Rosenberg’s terms) “It is part of 
reality. It is as real as a rock. The experience of an experiencing being is 
everything about what it is like to be that being, experientially speaking, 
from moment to moment as it lives its life.” (Strawson, 2010:3) Experience 
and machines are one.” Furthermore, Tallis points out that “To cross the machine/mind 
barrier, it is not sufficient to make the mind machine-like; one must do so using terms that 
have already unobtrusively mentalized machines.” (Tallis, 2004: 35.) For more information 
on the topic see Why the Mind in not a Computer by Raymond Tallis.
3. In fact, over the last decades neuroscientific research has tried to find ways to objectively 
studying subjective experience, see Blanco (2017: 96), for a broad overview of the significant 
advances made in this field.
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in this case is taken to be everything available to the mind at any moment, 
ranging from hearing a song, to reading a sentence or tasting an apple. 
Not only is experience as real as rock, according to Strawson, but he also 
states that “…As a real physicalist, I hold that the mental/experiential 
is physical” However “… when I say these words I mean something com-
pletely different from what many physicalists have apparently meant by 
them. I certainly don’t mean that all the characteristics of what is going 
on, in the case of experience, can be described by physics and neurophy-
siology, or any non-revolutionary extension of them. That idea is crazy. 
(Strawson, 2008: 56). In the domain of emotions, thoughts, sensations and 
other such related mental phenomena, it is extremely difficult to think of 
a way in which public appeal to physics would explain essentially private 
phenomena. One can say that atoms and particles are involved in mental 
phenomena, but it is a far stretch to claim that these particles explain 
mental phenomena in any relevant and illuminating manner. Differing ra-
dically from Rosenberg, Strawson claims that “…experiential phenomena 
‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and 
neurophysiology record (or can record). No one who disagrees with this is a 
real physicalist in my terms.” (Strawson, 2008: 56) Experiences, as viewed 
by Strawson are private phenomena and private phenomena are not avai-
lable for public observation. Those who think that physics will describe the 
brain completely are making a category error. 
As Strawson points out “When aspiring materialists consider the 
living brain… they often slide into supposing that the word “brain” so-
mehow refers only to the brain-as-described-by-current physics. But this 
is a mistake, for it refers… [to] the living brain as a whole, the brain in 
its total physical existence and activity.” But this view misses (at least) 
half the picture because “Realistic – real – materialists must agree that 
the total physical existence and activity of the brain of an ordinary, living 
person, considered over time, is constituted by Experiential phenomena 
[‘introspection’] (if only in part) in every sense in which it is constituted (in 
part) by non-Experiential phenomena characterized by physics.” (Anthony 
& Hornstein, 2003. 52). Thus, to get a full understanding of the brain, the 
publicly observable aspects of the brain with neurons, synapses and inter-
locking brain regions is simply not enough to understand everything the 
brain does, on the contrary the brain-as-described-by-physics leaves out 
experience from this picture altogether. One can say that consciousness 
is an illusion, or is wrong about what it represents, but to leave out expe-
rience at this level of analysis is missing out on most of reality. Strawson 
suggests an intuitive manner that may help in thinking about experience 
“[a] good way to convey what it is to be a real realist about experience is 
to say that it’s to continue to take colour experience or taste experien-
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ce… or experience of pain, or of an itch, to be what one took it to be who-
lly unreflectively – what one knew it to be in having it – before one did 
any philosophy, e.g. when one was five.” (Bayne & Montague, 2014: 288) 
People clearly communicate private experiences, and people understand 
each other when someone says “I felt pain” or “I saw a red car”. However, 
communicating through language should not be confused with the actual 
first-person experience, which remains essentially private.
In Strawson’s view, the whole of reality, including (but not limited 
to) things that can be publicly observed, must include ‘experience’ – but 
experience is not something that is open to publicly observability the way 
the behavior of particles or even of people are available for public inspec-
tion. In fact, it can be stated that the most essential aspects of experience 
do not require any reference to public observation at all. But how can this 
be possible? People routinely judge other people’s emotions and mental 
states based on observable behavior. Clearly then, observable behavior 
is essential for an account of mental experience. Although it may initia-
lly seem counter-intuitive, Strawson provides a thought experiment that 
shows that reference to public observability is not essential to understand 
experience. This thought experiment could also, at the same time, hint at 
the limits to which science may not explain. It may not be possible to get 
a quantitative account of qualitative mental states. But before developing 
this conclusion, it is time to examine Strawson’s hypothetical alien race 
the “Sirians.”  
Strawson’s Sirians
To take one example – which could be multiplied many times over 
attaching different sensations – Strawson asks people to consider the 
hypothetical alien race the Sirians. “The Sirians are a red-skinned alien 
race who turn white once a year when their moon is full. This phenome-
non, call it X, is a taboo subject for them, and it is talked about as little 
as possible. Even to think about X is held to be wrong, and no one would 
admit to doing it. And yet they all do it.” For purposes of illustration one 
is presented with an alien species completely compatible with known phy-
sical laws as well as natural selection, which just so happens to have one 
particular subject matter ‘X sensation’ – which is considered a forbidden 
topic. It is either rude or disgusting to talk about X in a public situation. 
So far, this situation presents no problems to the notion of public obser-
vability. Once a year, empirical observation could demonstrate a causal 
connection between a full moon, and the Sirians turning white and there 
are no further complexities so far. However, this X phenomenon “has a 
price: whenever the Sirians think about X, they subsequently experience 
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very severe pains in the head. And this happens only after they have thou-
ghts about X, for they are not subject to any other sort of pain sensation.” 
Furthermore, “they have no word[s] for them [X sensations].” (Strawson, 
2010:226) Because, as mentioned before, this is not an appropriate topic 
for conversation. Now that a private experience is taken into account, X 
sensation, which is roughly equivalent to ‘pain’ for human beings, the view 
of empirical as being ‘publicly observable’ becomes problematic. One can 
see a change in colour, but one cannot necessarily see effects from changes 
in particular thought patterns. “…S sensations have no other-observable 
typical cause and no other-observable behavioral effects. As for the cause, 
thinking about X is a purely mental performance, a matter of dwelling on 
something in imagination, and there is nothing is particular that sets it 
off.” (last italics mine.) Purely mental performances and associated acts 
of mental activity are dismissed by Rosenberg: “there is no mind distinct 
from the brain.” (Rosenberg, 2011: 147) But appeals to the errors of cons-
cious thought in perception does not deny the reality of these experiences. 
Particularly problematic from an empirical-as-publicly-observable fra-
mework is that, in the case of the Sirians “As for the effects, the Sirians 
never talk about S sensations [Part of X feeling] , nor do they behave in 
any characteristic nonverbal way on experiencing S sensation. No instinct 
prompt them to move in any way.” Similar to a human being as “[w]e 
tend to be less inclined to move our heads when we have a headache”. But 
people may move their heads when they have a headache, and there is no 
necessary publicly observable characteristic that can be pointed to when 
one had a painful headache. 
So far in Strawson’s account of the Sirians, there may be situations 
in which one may have an experience, X, to which there is no behavioral 
data available. If there can be inner accounts of experiences such as X 
or Y, how can there be thoughts about them, if matter cannot relate to 
matter, as Rosenberg claims? If what Rosenberg says is true, one would 
have to side with a variety of scienticism and claim that in aboutness “The 
process of illusion building finishes off when the neural circuits in the bra-
in have been trained by operant conditioning to respond appropriately to 
noises other people make…” (Rosenberg, 2011: 203) Nevertheless, Straw-
son replies to such an argument by “…even if there were a necessary con-
nection between being in pain and being disposed to engage in some sort 
of (avoidance) behavior, it would not follow that there was a necessary 
connection between being in pain and being disposed to engage in publicly 
observable behavior, so that the one thing could not exist with the other.” 
Furthermore, he adds that “The way to avoid S sensations after thinking 
about X might not involve any publicly observable behavior. It might be 
discovered that the way to do it was to think about Y before thinking about 
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X.” (Strawson, 2010: 236) And thought, of X or Y only entail mental activi-
ty and not empirical as publicly-available data.
Another option would be to side with Strawson and argue that “… 
I think it is obvious that the connection between pain [and other sensa-
tions] and (observable) behavior is, strictly speaking a contingent one, and 
that one can see this as soon as one puts aside one’s philosophical training 
for a moment. The connection is contingent because pain can exist in the 
complete absence of any (observable) behavior… It does not have to have 
any observable causes or correlates or effects or expressions in order to be 
pain. It does not have to have any function in order to be pain.” (Strawson, 
2010: 240-241). Under this argument, matter can be about matter, and no 
deep mystery is involved. The problem of ‘public observability’ becomes 
transparent only when the scientific method over-reaches its epistemic do-
mains, which admittedly, are not clearly delniated4. 
Views on the Brain
For Rosenberg the human brain is more complex than a rat’s, but 
only by a matter of degrees “In the human hippocampus (and the rest of the 
cortex too), there are vastly more neurons to be changed, even more than 
in the rat hippocampus. But the basic process is the same.” One should 
not be surprised to hear such statements, if one takes experience to be “a 
trick”. It then only follows from empirical-defined as publicly observable 
that the brain is some type of computer, and that complex interactions can 
be explained within a relatively straight-forwards computational method: 
“Neuroscientists have already begun to discover how information is distri-
buted within large sets of neuron circuits in the brain. These large set are 
composed of vast numbers of small sets of neurons with extremely specia-
lized abilities. These small sets of neural activities have specific response 
patterns because they are very highly tuned input/output circuits.” Since 
the mind (as opposed to the brain) is viewed empirically-as-publicly obser-
vable and assumed to be a computer, and since “introspection” (or Straw-
son’s ‘experience’) tricks us almost all the time, it only follows that quite 
complex behavior such as recognizing one’s mother can be explained in the 
4. Susan Haack points out that “…the fact is the term “science” simply has no clear boundaries: 
the reference of the term is fuzzy, indeterminate, and, not least frequently contested.” However 
Haack adds that “This is not to say that we can’t, in a rough and ready, distinguish between 
the sciences and other human activities, including other human cognitive activities… at 
first approximation… science is best understood… as a kind of inquiry… [and we] need to 
acknowledge that the work we pick out by the word “science” is far from uniform or monolithic.” 
(Haack, 2013: 112) It’s also far from clear that there can ever be such a thing as a “science of 
experience”, unless one denies experience an clings on to the idea that the mind is the brain, 
and that the science of the brain will reveal everything about the so called mental.
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following manner: “By the time your brain has fully developed, there are 
actually a set of neurons whose synapses have been wired together so that 
the only thing they do is respond to the visual input of your mother’s face, 
with some neural output that leads to mother-recognizing behavior like 
saying “Hi, mom” when you see her face.” (p.183). The conclusion to this 
line of thinking, is practically inevitable “The brain is a computer whose 
“microprocessors” – its initial assemblies of neural circuits – are hardwi-
red by a developmental process that starts before birth and goes on after 
it. Long before that process is over, the brain has already started to modify 
its hardwired operating system and acquire data fed in through its sensory 
apparatus. What happens to it doesn’t differ in any significant way from 
what happens to [IBM’s] Watson.” (Rosenberg, 2011: 189) In other words, 
the idea here is that one looks at a lump of matter like the brain and one 
assumes it does almost the same things a computer like IBM’s Watson can 
also do. This may be plausible if one denies that first-person experience is 
a trick, as Rosenberg claims “Scienticsm shows that the first-person POV 
[point of view] is an illusion.” (Rosenberg, 2011: 194)
Things look quite different if one approaches the brain assuming 
what is already given, that experience, the most obvious material fact of 
people’s existence, is real. Consider Strawson’s approach when looking at 
the brain from a publicly-observable perspective “For what, expressed in 
common-sense terms, does physics find in the volume of spacetime occu-
pied by a brain? Not a sludgy mass [or concrete stuff], but an astonishingly 
(to us) insubstantial-seeming play of energy, an ethereally radiant vibran-
cy. It finds, in other words, a physical object, which, thus far examined 
is like any other.” However, far from suggesting that “physics tells us 
everything we need to know about the nature of reality.” (Rosenberg, 2011: 
17) Strawson states that “All this being so, do we have any good reason 
to think we know anything about the non-mental physical… that licenses 
surprise – even the mildest surprise – at the thought that the Experiential 
[introspection] is physical?” I do not think so… the ghost in the machine is 
special, but it is certainly a machine, and the machine, like the rest of the 
physical world, is already a bit of a ghost – as ghostly, in Russell’s view, “as 
anything in a spiritualist séance”.  (Anthony & Hornstein, 2003:70) (Italics 
mine). Not only is matter, deep down, far from resembling anything con-
crete, it has ghostly properties, some of which people are directly acquain-
ted with in simply having thoughts the way they do when living ordinary 
life on a daily basis. There are no good reasons to believe that appeals to 
public observability of the brain shows that thoughts are “tricks” which are 
“illusion[s] that we actually have thoughts about the mind…” (Rosenberg, 
2011:218). If there is no reason to be surprised that not only are thoughts 
real physical phenomena, but also that en non mental matter can give rise 
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to thought, what does Strawson say of philosophers like Rosenberg, who 
deny the reality of the mental? Strawson states that “It is an extraordi-
nary suggestion, and what is most striking about it in the present context 
is that it constitutes the most perfect demonstration in the history of philo-
sophy of the grip of the very thing that it seeks to reject: dualist thinking.” 
(Anthony & Hornstein, 2003: 71) In other words, those who maintain a 
publicly observable perspective towards empirical research are engaged in 
dualism. But how can this be given that Rosenberg maintains that physics 
fixes all the facts? “The eliminitavists make the same initial mistake as 
Descartes – the mistake of assuming that they understand more about 
the nature of the physical than they do…” But things are even worse for 
these eliminitavists because “…their subjugation to dualist thinking is far 
deeper than Descartes’s. They are so certain that the physical excludes the 
Experiential that they are prepared to deny the reality of the Experiential 
in some (admittedly unclear) way…” This for Strawson constitutes “the 
most ridiculous claim ever made in philosophy.” (Anthony & Hornstein, 
2003:71) 
Appealing to matter as what is open to observation leads to the 
denial of the most obvious, and what should also be uncontroversial, fact 
of existence: the reality of experience. The problem, for Rosenberg and 
others who deny the reality of “introspection” or “experience” is not that 
they have any solid evidence for these claims, for the evidence given is 
weak and only obscures the reality of experience, but rather that the claim 
people don’t have thought’s “about” anything is that such ideas rest on the 
“intuition that the mental or the Experiential is utterly different in nature 
from matter. But this intuition lacks any remotely respectable theoretical 
support… The truth is that dualism has nothing in its favor… and it has 
Occam’s razor… against it.” (Anthony & Horstein, 2003: 75). Rosenberg 
would deny charges of dualism and would likely claim that Strawson is the 
one who is committing himself to dualism because Strawson believes that 
experience is the most obvious and indubitable fact of human existence. 
One is left pondering the question, is public observability the best criterion 
for what constitutes the realm and reach of the empirical? If one believes 
that physics, as it currently stands, “fixes all the facts”, the answer would 
obviously be ‘yes’ and this is because physics has been so successful in ex-
plaining the laws of the universe that there is no reason to expect that it 
won’t explain or reduce ‘mental phenomena’ some time in the future. Tho-
se who believe, with Strawson, that appeals to public observability leave 
out a whole vast array of emotions, sensations and rich mental life would 
say ‘no’, because personal experience is a prerequisite for public observabi-
lity in the first place. They would also claim that “Physics is one thing, the 
physical is another.” (Anthony & Hornstein, 2003: 49) These are different 
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epistemic domains. In fact, Strawson, quotes Russell, who points out that 
“We know nothing about the intrinsic quality of physical events except 
when these are mental events that we directly experience.” (Anthony & 
Hornstein, 2003: 56). Although Strawson think Russell puts the point too 
strongly, in that Strawson thinks that the structure physics describes are 
part of its intrinsic nature, Russell’s main argument is undeniable and 
can even be reformulated in the following manner: People know nothing 
about public observability except insofar as it is experiential. Experience 
thus cannot be reduced to ‘illusions’ because then the publicly observable 
results attained would be equally illusory, if not more so.
Conclusion
Charges or discussions about who is a dualist and who is not a dua-
list, however, is not the main concern of this paper. What has been attempted 
here is to show how restricting the use of the word and concept of ‘empirical’ to 
mean ‘public observation’ leads to an impoverished view of the extent of human 
mental life. To claim that “physics fixes all the facts” or that thoughts aren’t 
about anything is to fall into the mistake of thinking that the ‘empirical as 
publicly observable’ explains all the phenomena in the universe. The reality of 
the situation seems to be the exact opposite. If thoughts aren’t about anything 
how can one then defend the view that observable physics, chemistry and bio-
logy are about anything either? Appeals to the explanatory success of physics, 
chemistry and biology in this case lack foundation because the initial aspect 
that brought these sciences into life, first person private experience isn’t about 
physics, chemistry or biology. The empirical viewed as publicly observable also 
has to explain why thoughts are so often correct, instead of them occasionally 
being illusory. People talk about thoughts and talk about what these thoughts 
are about without any difficulty, if these are illusions or tricks, empirical-as-pu-
blicly-observable science must be able to account how people are able to talk 
about the Paris, or one’s mother and refer to these specific entities. It would 
be difficult to believe that ordinary people have almost essentially the same 
hallucinations countless times a day. Finally, empirical viewed as publicly ob-
servable must be able to explain how private sensations like love, laughter or 
pain apparently arise as internal mental phenomena in behavioral, observable 
terms. The problem Strawson raises with the Sirians seems to indicate that 
private sensations need not have any external observable behavior at all. Pu-
blic observability would have to find a way to explain how something that feels 
painful or unpleasant privately is not really about anything painful, because 
painful things must be cashed out by observable behavior.
All the demands listed for public observability and for thoughts being 
about things do not arise if one takes experience to be a fundamental fact of 
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human existence. If one should seek to avoid the arguments made by Rosen-
berg, all one has to do is to broaden one’s view of what the empirical actually 
encompasses. The concept and word empirical is more clearly articulated by 
the term ‘experiential-empiricism’. Under experiential empiricism, experien-
ce remains the fundamental epistemic anchor to both oneself as well as the 
world. Furthermore, experiential empiricism has no problems in adopting pu-
blic observability and thus science can proceed without any impediments. As 
Strawson suggests, sometimes the best way to view reality is to ignore philo-
sophy and to take what one sees and what one hears as what they are when 
one was a child. Of course, with the advent of science it is now known that 
reality, deep down, is different from the way it is represented in the mind, but 
this does not in any way imply that what is represented in the mind is false: 
it is only the way reality is viewed by human beings. Public observability 
and experience need not clash after all. In fact, when they are combined, as 
they are for every person in the world, scientists and philosophers are given 
the only two tools required to understand the world, private experience and 
observable (and repeatable) experiments. The latter allows for amazing disco-
veries in science, the former gives people an infinitely rich mental life which 
can help people contemplate science, and much, much more. 
(Endnotes)
1  “Empirical.” Def. 1, 2, 3 www.merriam-webster.com. Merriam Webster (n.d). 
January 30, 2017.  Different dictionaries have virtually identical definitions. See the Cam-
bridge and Oxford dictionaries definitions of the word ‘empirical’ online for more examples. 
None of these definitions take into account inner mental states, which should be the object of 
study for issues pertaining to the mind, and not merely based on public observability.
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